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Abstract	
	
In	 Philosophical	 Investigations	 (henceforth	 PI),	 Ludwig	 Wittgenstein	 presents	 a	
famous	 argument	 called	 “the	 private	 language	 argument”	 (PLA).	 The	 PLA	 has	 been	treated	as	one	of	the	decisive	criticisms	of	Cartesian	dualism,	which	locates	“mind”	in	the	inner	realm	of	each	person,	in	contradistinction	to	“material	things”	in	the	outer	world.	
However,	it	is	difficult	to	grasp	the	PLA’s	true	intention	and	potential.	The	PLA	has	been	interpreted	as	a	kind	of	reductio	ad	absurdum.	Gordon	Baker	has	recently	 questioned	 this	 interpretation,	 insisting	 that	 the	 PLA	 is	 intended	 not	 as	 a	
demonstration	but	as	the	initiation	of	a	change	in	our	way	of	seeing	things	imprisoned	by	linguistic	illusions.		This	 presentation	 develops	 Baker’s	 new	 framework	 by	 associating	 it	 with	
Wittgenstein’s	 philosophy	 of	 mathematics,	 which	 was	 his	 main	 concern	 before	 he	changed	 the	 organization	 of	 PI	 to	 include	 considerations	 about	 mental	 concepts,	beginning	 with	 the	 PLA	 (the	 “intermediate	 version”	 of	 PI),	 instead	 of	 considerations	
about	 mathematics	 (the	 “pre‐war	 version”	 of	 PI).	 First,	 I	 show	 an	 illuminating	
connection	 between	 Baker’s	 framework	 and	 Wittgenstein’s	 view	 that	 mathematical	proofs	change	our	perspective.	 I	 then	propose	to	associate	with	the	PLA	a	 fragment	of	
Wittgenstein’s	view	of	rule‐following,	written	just	before	he	changed	the	organization	of	
PI.	 This	 connection	 is	 found	 in	 the	 inevitable	 factors	 in	 the	 rule‐following	 of	 the	
circumstance	surrounding	linguistic	activity	and	the	reaction	of	a	linguistic	agent,	which	
shed	light	on	the	contingency	and	locality	of	language	understanding.	
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1. Introduction	
In	Philosophical	Investigations	(henceforth	PI),	the	masterpiece	of	the	later	
Wittgenstein,	is	a	very	famous	argument	called	“	the	private	language	argument”		
(henceforth,	PLA).	The	PLA	lies	at	the	beginning	of	critiques	of	the	notion	that	mental	
concepts	such	as	pain,	thoughts,	images,	and	consciousness	describe	private	processes	
occurring	in	the	inner	realm	of	each	person.	The	PLA	has	been	treated	as	representative	
of	the	critique	of	Cartesian	dualism,	which	locates	the	mind	in	the	inner	world	in	contrast	
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with	the	body	and	material	things	in	the	outer	world.	In	examining	the	PLA	closely,	
however,	grasping	its	genuine	points	and	its	potentiality	is	a	difficult	task.	
Up	to	the	present,	the	PLA	has	been	interpreted	as	a	kind	of	reductio	ad	absurdum.	
However,	Gordon	Baker	has	recently	called	this	interpretation	into	question,	insisting	that	
the	PLA	 is	 intended	not	 as	 a	demonstration,	but	 rather	as	 an	effort	 to	bring	about	of	 a	
change	in	our	way	of	seeing	things,	a	way	of	seeing	things	that	has	been	held	prisoner	by	
linguistic	illusions.	
This	 presentation	 develops	 the	 PLA	 interpretation	 further	 in	 Baker’s	 direction	 by	
focusing	 on	 the	 continuity	 between	 the	 PLA	 and	 Wittgenstein’s	 consideration	 of	 the	
philosophy	 of	 mathematics.	 Initially,	 Wittgenstein	 planned	 for	 PI	 to	 address	 the	
philosophy	of	 language	in	the	first	half	(§§1‐188)	and	the	philosophy	of	mathematics	in	
the	latter	half	(the	“prewar”	version	of	PI).	However,	in	the	spring	and	summer	of	1944,	
he	 altered	 the	 organization	 of	 the	 book	 such	 that	 instead	 of	 the	 philosophy	 of	
mathematics,	 the	 PLA	 and	 considerations	 on	 mental	 concepts	 are	 subsequent	 to	 a	
consideration	on	rule‐following	(the	“intermediate”	version	of	PI).	For	several	years	until	
1944,	Wittgenstein	expended	considerable	effort	on	the	philosophy	of	mathematics.	This	
presentation	 focuses	on	 the	continuity	between	 the	philosophy	of	mathematics	and	 the	
PLA.	
This	presentation	deals	in	particular	with	a	famous	section	of	the	PLA,	§258.	In	the	
next	 section,	 I	 outline	 of	 §258	 and	 its	 interpretative	 problems.	 Subsequently,	 I	 present	
Baker’s	new	interpretation	(§3).	His	interpretation	can	be	understood	to	a	greater	depth	
if	we	pay	attention	to	Wittgenstein’s	consideration	of	mathematics;	based	on	this,	 I	use	
Baker’s	framework	to	develop	a	further	interpretation	(§4).	I	suggest	a	way	with	regard	
to	the	interpretation	of	PI	in	the	closing	section	(§5).	
2. §258	of	PI	
The	story	of	§258	is	as	follows.	“I”	want	to	keep	a	diary	about	the	recurrence	of	a	
certain	sensation.	To	this	end,	I	associate	it	with	the	sign	“S”	and	write	this	sign	on	a	
calendar	for	every	day	on	which	I	have	the	sensation.	Wittgenstein	takes	this	
assumption	as	he	wants,	first,	“to	observe	that	a	definition	of	the	sign	cannot	be	
formulated.”	Responding	to	this,	a	further	assumption	is	added.	It	is	supposed	that	“S”	is	
defined	through	a	kind	of	ostensive	definition	such	as	speaking	or	writing	the	sign	down	
and	at	the	same	time	concentrating	my	attention	on	the	sensation.	Regarding	this,	he	
says,	“But	what	is	this	ceremony	for?	For	that	is	all	it	seems	to	be!	A	definition	serves	to	
lay	down	the	meaning	of	a	sign,	doesn’t	it?”	The	response	to	this	is:	“Well,	that	is	done	
precisely	by	concentrating	my	attention;	for	in	this	way	I	commit	to	memory	the	
connection	between	the	sign	and	the	sensation.”	Here	are	Wittgenstein’s	last	words	in	
this	section:	
		
But	“I	commit	it	to	memory”	can	only	mean:	this	process	brings	it	about	that	I	
remember	the	connection	correctly	in	the	future.	But	in	the	present	case,	I	have	no	
criterion	of	correctness.	One	would	like	to	say:	whatever	is	going	to	seem	correct	to	
me	is	correct.	And	that	only	means	that	here	we	can’t	talk	about	“correct”	(PI	§258).	
	
There	are	many	criticisms	of	the	above	“argument.”	For	example,	it	is	possible	for	a	
private	language	speaker	to	talk	about	“correct”	because	it	is	possible	for	each	private	
language	speaker	to	identify	their	own	sensation,	keep	that	in	their	memory,	and	
recognize	a	similar	sensation	when	it	occurs	in	the	future	without	external	criteria;	a	
public	community	is	not	necessary	for	deciding	what	is	correct	because	the	stability	of	
the	speaker’s	disposition	is	sufficient.	Therefore,	if	we	regard	the	above	“argument”	as	a	
kind	of	reductio	ad	absurdum,	we	must	provide	some	grounds	for	why	what	is	accessible	
to	private	language	speakers	is	insufficient	grounds	for	correct	or	incorrect.	Here,	both	
the	for	and	against	for	the	argument	are	inconclusive.	
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3. Baker’s	Interpretation	
Recently,	Gordon	Baker	presented	a	new	interpretation.	According	to	him,	the	PLA	
is	not	intended	to	give	a	demonstration	of	reductio	ad	absurdum.	The	main	concern	of	
the	PLA	is	rather	to	remove	the	prejudice	that	stands	in	the	way	of	our	seeing	the	actual	
use	of	expressions．	
One	of	Baker’s	main	interpretative	strategies	is	comparing	the	PLA	with	the	
opening	sections	of	PI,	where	Wittgenstein’s	point	is	much	easier	to	see.	There,	Baker	
says,	Wittgenstein	calls	attention	to	a	set	of	very	general	notions	that	affect	almost	
everybody	who	reflects	on	the	meaning	of	words—namely,	the	notions	that	every	word	
is	a	name,	that	the	meaning	of	a	word	is	the	object	correlated	with	it,	and	that	every	
sentence	is	a	combination	of	words	with	the	function	of	describing	some	state	of	affairs.	
Wittgenstein	notes	that	this	widespread	conception,	“a	particular	picture	of	the	essence	
of	human	language”	(PI	§1),	“surrounds	the	working	of	language	with	a	haze		which	
makes	clear	vision	impossible”	(PI	§5).	Baker	characterizes	that	picture,	using	
Wittgenstein’s	phrase,	as	a	“grammatical	illusion,”	and	indicates	that	the	PLA	deals	with	
the	same	grammatical	illusion,	which	elaborates	the	model	of	name	and	designation	
(Baker	1998:	348).		
By	finding	similarities	between	the	PLA	and	the	opening	sections	of	PI,	Baker	
makes	an	important	remark	concerning	§258.	Wittgenstein	imagines	a	very	simple	
system	of	signs	in	the	opening	sections	of	PI	(§§2‐3)	and	then	goes	on	to	use	this	simple	
language	game	as	an	object	of	comparison	to	highlight	both	its	differences	and	
similarities	with	the	everyday	use	of	words.	Hence,	following	Baker,	the	example	of	a	
sensory	diary	in	§258	is	not	a	part	of	a	reductio	ad	absurdum	but	a	language	game	
invented	as	an	object	of	comparison.	“Comparison	between	genuine	names	of	sensations	
and	‘S’	in	this	imaginary	language‐game	makes	perspicuous	just	how	far	the	everyday	
use	of	the	words	‘pain’,	‘fair’,	etc.	deviates	from	the	models	of	the	mere	association	of	
signs	with	immediate	experiences”	(Baker	1998:	349).	Through	this	comparison,	we	
come	to	see	that	“we	must	establish	more	complex	patterns	than	what	is	present,	by	our	
hypothesis,	in	the	private	speakers’	activities”	(ibid.)	in	order	for	“S”	to	be	a	genuine	
name	of	a	sensation.	
Baker	closes	the	comparison	with	the	opening	sections	of	PI	by	stressing	that	the	
philosophical	activity	of	dispelling	grammatical	illusions	is	very	different	from	that	of	
mapping	the	logical	geography	of	“psychological	concepts.”	“It	more	often	consists	in	
taking	note	of	possibilities	to	which	one	is	blind	than	of	establishing	facts	of	which	one	is	
ignorant”	(Baker	1998:	349‐350).	The	example	Baker	invokes	for	this	point	is	very	
illuminating:	to	the	question	“How	do	words	refer	to	sensations?”	Wittgenstein	replies	
by	suggesting	the	possibility	of	teaching	the	word	“pain”	to	a	child	by	conditioning	him	to	
replace	natural	expressions	of	pain	(say	crying)	by	a	verbal	expression	of	pain	(PI	§244).	
Appropriately,	Baker	adds	that	taking	note	of	this	possibility	is	enough	to	escape	from	
the	compulsion	to	address	the	question	“What	does	an	avowal	of	pain	describe?”.	Baker	
concludes	that	attention	to	possibility	doesn’t	manifest	Wittgenstein’s	modesty,	but	his	
method	(Baker	1998:	350).	
4. From	Wittgenstein’s	Philosophy	of	Mathematics	
The	character	of	Baker’s	interpretation,	outlined	above,	is	revealed	more	vividly	in	
comparison	with	an	important	function	of	a	mathematical	proof	that	Wittgenstein	sheds	
light	on	in	his	philosophy	of	mathematics.	The	following	two	remarks,	the	former	of	
which	lies	in	the	PLA	and	the	latter	of	which	lies	in	remarks	about	mathematics,	show	
the	similarity	between	Wittgenstein’s	philosophy	and	his	conception	of	mathematics.	
	
What	is	your	aim	in	philosophy?	―	To	show	the	ϐly	the	way	out	of	the	ϐly‐bottle	(PI:	
§309).		
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Can’t	we	say:	the	figure	which	shews	you	the	solution	removes	a	blindness,	or	again	
changes	your	geometry?	It	as	it	were	shews	you	a	new	dimension	of	space.	(As	if	a	fly	
were	shewn	the	way	out	of	the	fly‐bottle)	(Wittgenstein	1984b:	Ⅰ‐§44).		
	
										In	his	philosophy	of	mathematics,	Wittgenstein	pays	attention	to	an	important	
function	of	the	mathematical	proof,	namely,	the	way	the	proof	brings	about	changes	in	
our	perspective.	(cf.	Irie,	2012)	In	a	1935	lecture,	Wittgenstein	compared	unsolved	
mathematical	problems	with	riddles.	
	
They	are	like	the	problem	set	by	the	king	in	the	fairy	tale	who	told	the	princess	to	
come	neither	naked	nor	dressed,	and	she	came	wearing	fish	net.	That	might	have	been	
called	not	naked	and	yet	not	dressed	either.	He	did	not	really	know	what	he	wanted	
her	to	do,	but	when	she	came	thus	he	was	forced	to	accept	it.	The	problem	is	of	the	
form,	Do	something	which	I	shall	be	inclined	to	call	neither	naked	nor	dressed.	It	is	the	
same	with	a	mathematical	problem.	Do	something	which	I	shall	be	inclined	to	accept	
as	a	solution,	though	I	do	not	know	what	it	will	be	like	(Wittgenstein	1979:	185‐6).		
	
When	the	king	gave	the	problem	to	the	princess,	there	seemed	to	be	nothing	to	satisfy	
the	conditions	of	the	problem	because	it	was	quite	natural	to	think	that	she	had	no	
alternative	but	to	come	either	naked	or	dressed.	However,	by	wearing	the	fish	net,	
“dressed”	was	changed	into	“wearing	clothes,”	and	a	space,	a	possibility	of	an	answer	
between	“naked”	and	“dressed”	emerged.	At	that	moment,	we	find	ourselves	in	an	
unnecessary	prison	(like	the	fly	in	the	fly‐bottle)	and	set	free.	The	most	interesting	point	
regarding	riddles	is	that	the	possibility	of	giving	an	answer	to	the	question	emerges	
afterward	by	the	giving	of	the	answer	itself.	In	the	relation	to	the	answer,	the	original	
problem	gets	a	new	aspect.	
										In	mathematics,	we	can	easily	find	a	similar	example	of	something	that	was	initially	
thought	to	be	impossible	proved	to	be	possible	afterward—namely,	the	discovery	of	
imaginary	numbers.	But	in	the	present	context	concerning	the	PLA,	the	proof	that	
trisecting	an	angle	with	a	ruler	and	compass	is	impossible,	discussed	by	Wittgenstein	
again	and	again,	is	more	important.	
	
I	can’t	ask	whether	an	angle	can	be	trisected	with	ruler	and	compass,	until	I	can	see	
the	system	“Ruler	and	Compasses”	as	embedded	in	a	larger	one,	where	the	problem	is	
soluble;	or	better,	where	the	problem	is	a	problem,	where	this	question	has	a	sense.	
	
This	is	also	shown	by	the	fact	that	you	must	step	outside	the	Euclidean	system	for	a	
proof	of	the	impossibility.	
	
A	system	is,	so	to	speak,	a	world	(Wittgenstein	1984a:	§152).		
	
(We	should	keep	in	mind	the	distinction	between	possibility	of	solving	the	problem	and	
impossibility	of	the	trisection	of	the	angle	with	ruler	and	compass	in	mind.	These	are,	so	
to	speak,	different	levels.)	Like	the	riddle,	here	the	original	problem	receives	a	new	
aspect	when	we	see	“the	system	‘Ruler	and	Compasses’	as	embedded	in	a	larger	one,	
where	the	problem	is	soluble.”	Here,	Wittgenstein	refers	to	a	mathematical	technique,	
translation,	in	which	the	original	problem	of	Euclidian	geometry	is	reformulated	in	
algebra	such	that	construction	with	ruler	and	compasses	is	translated	into	the	solution	
of	linear	and	quadratic	equations,	and	the	constructability	of	the	trisection	of	an	angle	is	
translated	into	the	solvability	of	a	special	type	of	cubic	equation.	When	we	compare	
geometric	constructions	with	solutions	of	equations	and	find	the	connection	between	
them,	the	original	problem	gets	a	new	aspect,	and	at	the	same	time,	the	possibility	of	a	
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solution	emerges.	We	manage	to	“step	outside	the	Euclidean	system”—outside	the	old	
world	into	a	new	world.	
												The	above	consideration	shows	the	importance	of	finding	new	aspects.	Baker	also	
refers	to	the	importance	of	making	apparent	aspects	that	are	hidden	from	us	(Baker	
1998:	352).	But	his	emphasis	is	put	on	dispelling	the	philosophical	illusion,	and	does	not	
pursuit	the	hidden	aspects	further.	Now,	our	main	topic	is	§258.	Can	we	pursue	the	
hidden	aspect	§258	reveals	further?	What	are	the	hidden	aspect	§258	reveals?	
5. A	Hidden	Aspect	that	the	PLA	reveals	
The	answer	to	the	last	question	in	the	previous	section	is	in	Baker’s	words	cited	in	
the	penultimate	paragraph	of	§3	in	this	presentation:	through	comparison,	we	come	to	
see	that	“we	must	establish	more	complex	patterns	than	what	is	present,	by	our	
hypothesis,	in	the	private	speakers	activities”	in	order	for	“S”	to	be	a	genuine	name	of	a	
sensation.	The	hidden	aspect	that	the	imaginary	language	game	in§258	reveals	is	the	
‘complex	pattern’	of	our	ordinary	linguistic	activity,	which	is	lacking	in	private	language.	
But	how	do	we	pursue	that	further?	
										Here	is	my	suggestion.	The	last	part	of	§258	strongly	indicates	the	first	landing	
point	of	the	“rule‐following	consideration”	(PI	§202),	which	includes	the	comment	that	
“to	think	one	is	following	a	rule	is	not	to	follow	a	rule.	And	that’s	why	it’s	not	possible	to	
follow	a	rule	‘privately.’”	Saul	Kripke	has	already	discussed	the	connection	between	the	
rule‐following	consideration	and	the	PLA,	but	in	my	conjecture,	we	can	pursue	a	
different	aspect	of	the	connection	shown	by	Kripke	by	directing	intensive	attention	to	a	
fragment	written	on	March	18,	1944	(Wittgenstein	2000:	MS	124,	149‐151).	There,	
Wittgenstein	focuses	on	essential	factors	of	rule‐following—that	is,	the	circumstances	
surrounding	linguistic	activity	and	the	reaction	of	a	linguistic	agent.	Moreover,	for	this	
hidden	aspect	of	the	connection	between	the	rule‐following	consideration	and	the	PLA	
to	be	revealed,	it	will	be	especially	useful	to	take	into	consideration	§262,	which	belongs	
to	a	stream	of	arguments	beginning	with	§256,	including	§258.	We	can	expect	that	
revealing	the	hidden	aspect	of	the	connection	will	bring	us	“natural	limits”	(Wittgenstein	
2000:	MS	124,	151)	that	determine	what	has	meaning	and	what	does	not,	showing	the	
penetration	of	contingency	and	locality	into	our	understanding	of	language.	This	is	one	
of	the	things	that	Wittgenstein’s	philosophy	will	bring	us	henceforth.	
6. Conclusion	
											It	can	be	said	that	this	presentation	deals	with	two	hidden	aspects	of	the	PLA.	One	
of	them	concerns	the	character	of	the	PLA,	the	other	what	the	PLA	reveals.	As	to	the	
former,	I	agree	with	Baker’s	interpretation	that	the	PLA	is	intended	not	as	a	
demonstration	but	as	the	initiation	of	a	change	in	our	way	of	seeing	things	imprisoned	
by	linguistic	illusions.	This	function	of	the	PLA,	the	hidden	aspect	Baker	reveals	is	
understood	deeply	by	comparing	it	with	an	important	function	of	the	mathematical	
proof,	namely,	the	way	the	proof	brings	about	changes	in	our	perspective.	Meanwhile,	
this	comparison	makes	us	realize	that	the	importance	of	new	aspects	the	PLA	reveals	
should	be	much	more	emphasized,	and	the	latter	of	the	two	hidden	aspects	concerns	this	
emphasis.	We	can	see	this	hidden	aspect,	which	§258	reveals,	in	detail	by	directing	
intensive	attention	to	a	fragment	concerning	rule‐following	written	on	March	18,	1944.	
This	aspect	is	expected	to	show	the	limits	of	language	in	later	Wittgenstein,	reflecting	
the	penetration	of	contingency	and	locality	into	our	understanding	of	language.	
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